husserl’s categorial intuition

March 12, 2013 § Leave a comment

categorial intuition

Reading the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is no small task. This is the kind of reading that requires patience along with the foresight that one will have to read and reread paragraphs till any semblance of coherence begins to unfold and unfurl. It is tempting bring in the analogy of mining for precious metals, where to find the philosophy, one would have to dig deep through the strata to find a bright and brilliant fragment of value. To think of Husserl’s phenomenology like this is a mistake. Robert Sokolowski toward the end of his paper on Husserl’s categorical intuition speaks of a clarified approach to philosophy in a general “Philosophy only works by quoting, so to speak, the pre-philosophical, and by presenting, from a new and special angle, what was already present in the pre-philosophical” (140). It is as if we must regard the basic experience of categorical intuition as already there in our day-to-day moments to understand it not only philosophically, but also phenomenologically. To do philosophy with Husserl is just a matter of bringing in the methods and challenges of phenomenology to bear in consciousness, to then thematize the minute complexity that’s already present in the totality of the experiences, perceptions, cognitions, and intentions themselves that are already alive with conscious experiencing.

The goal for this post will not be to summarize Husserl’s phenomenological project. Instead, we’ll turn our attention to a single feature, categorical intuition. This choice is not random since it will lead to some fundamental questions concerning Husserl’s early work developing phenomenology in the Logical Investigations. We’ll also look to Martin Heidegger’s elaboration and extension of the term in his 1925 lecture series titled History of the Concept of Time, these were the preliminary lectures that put forth much of the groundwork for Being and Time. It is also important to pay gratitude to Robert Sokolowski’s paper “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition.” Sokolowski always has a masterful way of making Husserl’s phenomenology accessible and clear. Dermot Moran also deserves high praise for all his scholarship surrounding Husserl’s philosophy. He introduces the shorter edition of the Logical Investigations we’re using here. In addition, Moran worked with Joseph Cohen on The Husserl Dictionary which provided a well needed resource for all the recondite phenomenological words Husserl deploys, coupled with their difficult to pin down ideas.

Categorial intuition (kategoriale Anschauung) (Moran, Cohen 59) is dealt with extensively throughout chapter six in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Let’s begin to unfold the term by trying to understand how we come to perceive things. Essentially when we perceive something we find it “fulfilled” as matter and we also understand these things as “…beyond their nominal terms” (Husserl 339). Fulfillment is a special term Husserl uses to indicate a kind of conscious immersion in the way the object is presented in its perceptual way, but this also involves the structure of how it’s identified and how it is intended. We’ll address fulfillment first, then go back to identification, so “…the fulfillment is the experience of the coincidence between the empty intention [not immediately present] and its fulfilling object” (Moran, Cohan 130). This fulfillment happens during the broader act of intending, which means roughly “…the ‘aboutness’ or ‘directedness of our conscious state (Moran, Cohan, 167). This then indicates that even when we have the intention of an object before us it is a fulfillment to be in recognition of the fact that the object is presently and fully regarded. The object is fulfilled during the intention of it. When absent the object is not present in this way—it is emptily intended “…in its intuitive absence it is [symbolized] …in a token way…” (Moran, Cohen 104).

The categorical is not the object itself but the way the object is present to our understanding of it. Sokolowski calls the categorical a “syntactical” (128). The word syntactical is a big hint that the categorical is a structural component that helps us understand our relationship to how we perceive the world in the round. Therefore, a syntactical structuring isn’t a component of linguistics exclusively, but to be regarded within experience in general, where the categorical is representative of the syntactical framework of experience. Husserl indicates that the categorical is connected to the syntactical term: “copula” (339). When Husserl writes of categorical intuition as it relates to a piece of white paper, he’s keen to make it clear that in a sentence like “white paper is paper which is white” the word “is” is categorical (341).

With all of this said, categorial intuition is much more than just the word “is”, it simultaneously has to do with how the presence of the is-ness of white is intuited within the perceptual experience and not built upon it. It has to do with the being of whiteness presented to us as we experience the paper. As Husserl puts it, it is how “…the apparent object announces itself as self-given” (341). There are points where Husserl calls the categorical “supersensuous” (349), probably to indicate that it involves the sensuous, while at the same time, the categorial also involves more than just sense. Sokolowski identifies the categorical in the way that the object is known to us as “presencing” (129). This is not a feature of the object in and of itself, but how it’s known to me in all its verisimilitude. This is a phenomenological way to explain and to present how an object is made objective not in successive steps, but simultaneously within the actual experience, where identification is brought together within the “presencing” of a particular object (Sokolowski 129). Sokolowski writes that this coming together of identity and presence where “the identity, the belonging of a feature to its object, the object’s being and such, is what corresponds intuitively to word ‘is’ when we say, ‘S is p’” (131).

We normally think of our world filled with stuff be we never stop to think of how we understand the in-between ‘is-ness’ of these things. The ‘is’ of these things has to do with the being of the things, yet even Husserl attests “among these [things] anything like ‘is’ is naturally not to be found” (345). A quick glance through the dictionary tells us that the meaning of the word “is” is the third person singular present of the word “be” (Oxford 715). This should give us the bigger hint that the idea of “is” has to do with being in a fundamental and experiential way. This “is” or its syntactical equivalents, do not just happen in subjective perception but in the fullest rush of all objective experience. So Husserl has to clarify that the intuition of the object as fulfilled and that our reflected judgment of a basic reflection is not something we do when we reflect on the “is” of something (347). Then he continues to define catergorial intuition partially by what it is not.

Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even the upon fulfillments of judgments, but in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies in the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense) (347).

There’s a phenomenological job to decipher what Husserl’s pointing to as much as it is to notice that he’s saying that the categorical does not happen “upon” the judgments, or “upon” the fulfillment of judgments. States of affairs are about the tangible world as it’s presented to us in a particular way where the judgment is “…essentially involved with conceptualization and generalization” (Moran, Cohen 173). This is part of how we conceptualize being prephilosophically, we know something is here or it is not here without anyone needing to thematize the occurrence for us. Yet, it is only when we put name to this phenomena do we begin describe the philosophical import of these primary acts of cognition that appear to elude everyday expression and then some.

Looking onward, anyone who has read even a little bit of Heidegger will know of the utmost precedence he placed on ontology—re: Dasein and being. Sokolowski, Moran and Cohen together attest the curious fact that Heidegger was strongly impressed with Husserl’s discovery of categorical intuition as it is inextricably linked to being (Moran, Cohen 60), (Sokolowski 128). In Heidegger’s exhaustive preliminary section given in his description of the “fundamental discover[ies]” (27) by Husserl of the three concepts of intentionality, categorical intuition and the a-priori, Heidegger writes that the objectivity of “…categorical intuition is itself the objective manner in which reality itself can become more truly objective” then he broadens this to “there is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology” (72). There’s a reason Heidegger is calling the categorical intuition a discovery, because what was there to be discovered had been with us all along—being. We use it, but we don’t know how we’re using it. We’re living within it. We just don’t know how to conceptualize the way we’re living within it. Let us recall that Husserl does write of the categorical as related to being “…so the concept of Being can arise only when some being, actual or imaginary, is set before our eyes” (347).

It’s easy to brush off Husserl only as a stepping-stone to better appreciate the mature Heidegger, which is what Heidegger might’ve approved of. The objective here is not to do that. All we had to do was look at one of Husserl’s terms unfold and then to notice that we have before us a phenomenological vantage that positions us before the expanse of experience itself—before Heidegger. The descriptive potential of trying to understand what catergorial intuition means will serve to broaden our capacity for knowledge of the abstractions that are involved with basic perception and how we intuit, experience and know them even before we put words to them.

Yet, there is always an almost perverse and hermetic quality to Husserl’s work that’s daunting and intimidating to most. This gives us reason to try learning to inhabit our world phenomenologically along with him, because phenomenology gives us the methods by which to know what’s already there. It is on the inside of the frustrating work as we sweat over the terms and their relationships that only gradually open up to conceptualization. None of this would happen without the work of reading and rereading Husserl’s many paragraphs till any semblance of coherence begins to unfold and disclose what we see before us and so on…

Aurelio Madrid

Works Cited

Heidegger, Martin. History of the Concept of Time. Trans, Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979. Print.

Husserl, Edmund. The Shorter Logical Investigations. Trans. J.N. Findlay. New York, NY: Routledge, 2001. Print.

“Is.” The Oxford College Dictionary. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007: 715. Print.

Moran, Dermot and Joseph Cohen. The Husserl Dictionary. New York, NY: Continuum, 2012. Print.

Sokolowski, Robert. “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition.” Philosophical Topics, 1982: 127-141. PDF file.


john scottus eriugena

December 18, 2011 § 2 Comments

…buried in words & entombed in hard-to-find books, we still look for you Eriugena. Obscure as you are, we find you in all those concealed places. This contemplative circumstance is yours, it’s under your tutelage that we’ve toiled to comprehend you. Legend has it that you were stabbed to death by your students with their pens & although we have no viable proof of this, we prosper little from the knowledge that such a man as yourself would die from these the tools of scholarly labor, knowing that the only way to find you is in the many paragraphs that feature your name written by so many other pens. Eriugena, you are kept alive & breathing by the written word. Eriugena, you are our nutritor (teacher) & we are your alumni (students). Eriugena you are nothing as you are super-essential.


Nathan Coley – “Heaven is a Place Where Nothing Ever Happens.”  2008

John Scottus Erigena (ca. 810–887) was an early medieval Christian philosopher. He worked under Charles the Bald (823-877) as a liberal arts teacher while writing philosophy in the only form he knew: Christian theology. The separation between theology & philosophy was not an issue for him, both were held together as one practice. For him, (philosophical) theology was the only way to heaven. He is known for his rare ability to translate Greek to Latin. This unusual skill shouldn’t obscure the fact that he was Irish. His name: Eriugena, essentially means he who originates from Ireland. His talent to translate Greek to Latin wasn’t only a linguistic skill, it also had to do with the philosophical nexus he helped to bring about from the Greek east (then Byzantium) to the Latin west (western Europe), where he called home. The Viking invasions of Ireland at the time, are what forced him to work in France. He was commissioned by Charles the Bald to translate what was then thought to be the work of Dionysius the Areopagite (unknown birth/death dates: probably 5-6th centuries), now known as Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite, not to be mistaken for St. Paul’s 1st century convert. His Greek to Latin translating extended to works by Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335-394), Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580-662) & others from the east. These Christian works from Byzantium are marked by strong neo-platonic overtones & some might say this thinking was itself influenced by explicit pagan ideals (re: Plotinus (ca. 205-270)). We’ll caution anyone led into imagining Erigena’s thought to have a purely eastern affection, since he made generous use of St Augustine’s (354-430) writings, who was also influenced by neo-platonic ideas, among other Christian leanings.


Joseph Kosuth – “Nothing” 1968

Early on, Eriugena was distinguished by his remarkable ideas, beginning with his involvement & refutation in the 9th century Predestination controversy started by Gottschalk of Orbais (ca. 808-867). This theological imbroglio had Gottschalk whipped, embarrassed & divested of his priestly duties, ending up in a monastery in Hautvillers (northeastern France). Gottshcalk’s position was that God was fully aware of & involved in man’s destiny from birth to death (a common ‘misconception’ even to this day). This position was officially refuted by Eriugena to be the opposite, whereby god is simple & unchanging, he doesn’t, as was presumed, predestine man’s will. Man’s will is his own. This is part of Eriugena’s radical claim to fame, as it centers man as the driver of his own destiny. (This & the nexus of Eastern & Western philosophies, brings Eriugena even closer to the brilliant (neo-platonic) syncretism of Pico della Mirandola (1463-94)). For Eriugena, man already severed his intimate relationship to god after the fall. After the fall, Adam & Eve were sexualized, ashamed of their bodies & fallen from grace. It was then put to man’s own responsibility to re-establish his ties to god, back the word of god & into his ultimate innate reason that was ultimately part of god to begin with. This is the return to god & this movement of the falling away of man’s reason, to be rejuvenated via rationality, logic, wisdom & this is dialectical (note: these are three of Eriugena’s so-called primary causes that reside in man, nature & god). Man is fallen away from wisdom & the return is his desired unification with god using wisdom & knowledge. Evil then, is simply the absence of the good in man. Philosophy (theology) is the way man finds this way back to the divine, this is his return. This exitus & reditus, exit & return, procession & return, runs throughout neo-platonism, thereby exposing the history of the dialectic to originate much earlier than G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), (in fact, suggesting where Hegel found the dialectic’s already established roots). Speculative dialectics are not to be wholly confused with Aristotelian logical dialectics. This differentiation is what we find with Hegel (although it’s further confused by the fact that Hegel wrote extensively on Logic. But, as we know this isn’t a mere re-emergence, or re-instatement of the Aristotelian formal logic (that we are so attached to nowadays) it regarded more as a metaphysical, transcendental logic).


Felix Gonzales-Torres – “Untitled (The End)” 1990

Speculative philosophy is born from the urge to bring it all together, in spite of the corporeal & fallible body. This is high idealism with a penchant for systematizing & unifying disparate parts. Hegel’s philosophy follows this speculative paradigm & is emblematic of this way of thinking. In this universal manner everything tends toward the absolute through the dialectical process that’s ideated through reason’s eventualities. We conceptualize this holistic union & can practice knowledge to become philosophically attuned as we (now with Eriugena) reach for the ecstasy of transcendence that’s nearer to god. According to Dermont Moran, Hegel considered Eriugena to be the father of German Idealism. As Hegel’s great ideology of the absolute tended away from the incidentals of everyday life, so did Erigena’s complex cosmology return us to the ‘super-essential’ realms of god & nature—away from the pleasures & pressures of the flesh.

The dialectic, as it is for our reading of Eriugena, has significance in the the way we view man’s place in the cosmic order, this to be centered & pivotal due to man’s intellectual ability to want to return to god’s goodness via his independent will & his wise reasoning. This, again, is the return & going back to god as extending from the fall. But, it’s also about regarding god as expressed in everything, suggesting god’s immanence, & this immanence eventually led to the conflation of Eriugena’s thought with pantheism. This immanence—or better named: theophany—is manifested in our very desire to quest for ultimate transcendence to god’s order. In other words, this theophany is one way god shows himself through us. Philosophy is a theophany of god. it’s how he appears to us, for Eriugena.

The theophany of god extends outward in a circular motion till we find theology in its outermost expression (or non-expression, as the case may be) taking us into another critical (non) component to Eriugena’s cosmology & that is: nothingness. This way of considering what god is not, is known as Eriugena’s negative theology, his apophatic theology. This is a definition of god in all that he is not. This gives full credit to the notion that god is nothing. This nothingness of god thereby positions god as super-essential, meaning that he’s beyond any nothingness we can conceive of. And this means god had to create all the known universe, earth, nature, mankind, creatures &c. out of nothing, that this nothing is included in all things. Yet, this nothing should never be defined as simply another element co-existing with god & the rest. The nothing is to be looked at as a privation of essence, before being & as non-being. Nothing is an essential lack of that which precedes being & since god is the creator of all as made manifest by his ‘word,’ the nothing includes that with cannot be defined by us & so it’s ultimately un-knowable by definition. Nothing is considered to be non-being. We can’t give Eriugena’s full argument for the nothing in this short space, but we’ll at the very least acknowledge it’s constancy throughout neo-platonism & throughout recent philosophy with its notable (at least for our usage) attention given by Hegel & Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).


Timur Si-Qin – “Legend” 2011

Since we didn’t mention it earlier, all of this talk of nothing, non-being, privation &c. is found in Eriugena’s masterpiece the “Periphyseon,” or “The Division of Nature.” Indeed, this is his very cosmology where he attempts the ominous task of classifying nature as god’s creation, from his creation to nothingness itself. For Hegel, the abstract nothing is given primacy in his work on logic, as much as negation is given prominence in the dialectical movement itself. The basis of abstract thought determination as identified by Hegel is dialectically resolved by the recognition of the mind’s ‘restless’ becoming of thought by means of its very conceptualizing against & with the nothing. Thought becomes thought determination as being itself is confronted with the very nothingness of being. Hegel states in his “Encyclopedia Logic”:

All that really matters here is consciousness about these beginnings: that they are nothing but these empty abstractions, & that each of them is as empty as the other; the drive to find in being or in both [being & nothing] a stable meaning is this very necessity, which leads being & nothing further along & endows them with a true, i.e., concrete meaning. (EL/139-40)

Hegel softly echoes Eriugena’s epistemology as god is understood by man to be super-essential being, a.k.a. nothing, so should man understand his own mind & his own perception as having these qualities dialectically—being & nothing in tandem—becoming universal knowing. In the Periphyseon Eriugena writes, paraphrasing Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite:

Everything understood & sensed is merely the appearance of the non-appearing, the manifestation of the hidden, the affirmation of the denied, the comprehension of the incomprehensible, the expression of the ineffable, the approach of the inaccessible, the understanding of the unintelligible, the body of the incorporeal…” (P/140)

Then even closer to Hegel’s concept of thought apprehension—by means of this dialectical movement of the mind from the emptiness of nothing with being becoming universal meaning—we find Eriugena’s medieval elaboration of man’s mind coming to know itself, the world & god (through reason & negative theology).

…for the human mind both knows itself & does not know itself. It knows that it is, but it does not know what it is. […] It is more praiseworthy for the mind not to know what it is than to know that it is; just as negation is more closely & fittingly related than affirmation to the praise of divine nature, & it is wiser to be ignorant of it than to know it; for ignorance of it is true wisdom since it is known better by not knowing. (P/244)

Just as man can conceive of god by understanding what he is & better, by what he’s not, so can man use this apophatic way to his own mind. Man is a microcosm of the universe, therefore his own mind, his own epistemology characteristically shares in the ontology of his known & unknown world. This way of knowing the mind is not only dialectical, but it’s simultaneously metaphysical.

nothingever mark mumford

Mark Mumford – “Nothing Ever Happened Here.” 2002

Once the moment of metaphysics is brought to the fore, we are drawn from the 8th & 18th centuries to Heidegger’s 20th century involvement with the nothing. In his destabilizing essay “What is Metaphysics?” This assuredly after god & after the absolute, instead we are looking through the nothing as it’s in contrast to being (Dasein) phenomenologically—through the anxious experience of our being. This confrontation is with the very question of what is there as being, or what being is not. This isn’t a negation of being, rather, nothing is repellent to being & is transcendent as it can only be, since we are being & not nothing. It’s almost as if this repellence is what confirms being in the existential anxiety of being. Our being can only confirm itself against nothing to become nothing less than being. Heidegger poetically writes of this:

Being held out into the nothing—as Dasien is—on the ground of concealed anxiety is its surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence.

Our inquiry concerning the nothing is to bring us face to face with metaphysics itself. (WM/106)

These considerations are metaphysical (briefly think of how this concept relates to religious practice in general) & this nothingness proposition is fundamental in our way of contemplating an idealistic way of knowing. We’ll have to admit that Heidegger’s nothing, Hegel’s nothing & Eriugena’s nothing vary in their subtleties. Heidegger’s nothing is in contrast to a simple negation of something (being) & it’s very close to Hegel’s in that Hegel thought of being as essentially co-defined with the nothing. Oddly, for Hegel at the very basis of an abstraction of being we can barely distinguish it from nothing, yet we have no choice but to choose being from the two, since it’s the only primary abstraction of thought that is manifestly there for us & this is where meaning arises in its becoming—as it becomes self-determined thought, as it knows itself, as it’ll self-consciously know the world & as the world is reflected in this movement back to knowing objectively.

For Erigena, as we’ve alluded to already, nothing is also as complicated as the others, in that it’s non-essential, non-being, & privative. This still continues to define god as super-essential, so that if god is everything & nothing, he’s only that as far as our comprehension can conclude. If we were to then draw our own conclusions about all three views, we’ll have to transcendentalize a point of refuge with these thoughts, into the realm of that which cannot be comprehended. If we have an answer for everything, then we know nothing about our limitations. If we can see our limitations, then we can then imagine our possibilities.

Certainly, Eriugena was radical for his controversial views on predestination. Popular Christian opinion makes constant use of god’s active participation in the lives of men. We rarely (never) hear talk of god as letting man to his own devices. Man thus, in Eriugena’s context has to activate his own free-will to realize god’s theophany as reason toward a higher good. Aside from this, we’ll have to embrace Eriugena’s apophatic, neo-platonic ideas as vital for the basic philosophical issues they help to uncover. Common thought is normally concerned with what is, rather that what is not. If we cut off our ability to conceive of that which is mysterious & unknown, then what possibility is there? Positivist thinking destroys the nothing because thought ‘must always be about something.’ Although both Eriugena & Hegel had the dialectic as teleological & headed into reason, god & the absolute, we can see the break from this in the very conception of having to regard that which isn’t, in order to grasp the basic structure of metaphysical thought that’s so maligned in the scientific way of limiting the world—as Heidegger helps us to see. What are we without metaphysics?—a dry materialism only that proffers tangible facts, thereby cutting its imagination off from the dream of the unknown. That which we cannot know has everything to do with what we know, this is a universal way of opening the movement of thought into itself, throughout the world & into the void of the future.

Aurelio Madrid

ad reinhardt

Ad Reinhardt – “Abstract Painting” 1963

Works Cited / Bibliography

Carabine, Deirdre. John Scottus Eriugena. New York: Oxford U. Press. 2000.

Eriugena, John Scottus. (P) Periphyseon – On the Divison of Nature. Trans. Myra L. Uhlfelder. Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1976.

Hegel, G.W.F. (EL) The Encyclopedia Logic. Trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, H.S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett Pubs. Co. Inc. 1991.

Heidegger, Martin. (WM) Basic Writings, What is Metaphysics? Ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Perennial – Modern Thought. 2008.

Moran, Dermot. The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. New York: Cambridge U. Press. 1989.

deleuze & nietzsche on death mountain

September 18, 2011 § 9 Comments


Taiyo Onorato & Nico Krebs / Reflexman, C-Print, 75 x 95 cm

Deleuze and Nietzsche on Death Mountain

“Longing is the agony of the nearness of the distant.” —Heidegger

The following dream report is a fictional account of the 20th century philosopher Gilles Deleuze. The dream is narrated by Deleuze and is concerning the 19th century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. It is well known that Deleuze wrote extensively about other philosophers: Spinoza, Hume, Bergson, Leibniz, and of course Nietzsche. Deleuze was famously contra Hegel, so his exploration of other thinkers noticeably positioned his thought far away from the absolutions of Hegel. This moving away from Hegel for Deleuze, is detectible with Nietzsche’s death of god. The death of god began to alleviate the philosophical need to ‘bring it all together.’ Philosophy was taking this radical turn with Nietzsche, to then be steadfastly affirmed with Deleuze. Importantly, Nietzsche’s ideas on force and forces (the will to power) are fundamental to his notion of affirmation. Affirmation is a life force, whereas ressentiment (reactionary force) is life-denying. This is what the dream transformations are all about. The reason a dream report is used here as a backdrop, is to reference the creative side of philosophy that both thinkers continually ascribed to. This creative force is to be countered by the notion that philosophy need only to be preoccupied with defining truth, bringing things together, or unifying a systematic way of thought. All of that was Hegel’s job, as it was Plato’s work too. When we actually read Deleuze and find the words: affirmation, difference, and multiplicity, these (with many others) all stem from his close re-reading of Nietzsche.  Nietzsche offered a way out of the old ways and Deleuze takes this seriously enough to be heavily influenced by his self appointed teacher/s. With this said, bear in mind that Deleuze’s way of implementing ideas still follows a great tradition in philosophy, which is to return those who have come before us. Yet, this is a radical return to find the new in the ideas of the old. It is a way of passing through knowledge to find less of an identity and more of what is unfamiliar, thus creating another frontier for anyone to look for an alternate way of seeing things—over and over, never to be the same again.  —Aurelio Madrid


These days working in Vincennes exhaust me like a sedative taken when one cannot sleep, and precious sleep itself becomes work to find fresh again. The last few weeks have seen me becoming listless enough to begrudge what I can’t have. All this has been reminding me of what’ll never be the same and is always lost. To be sure, we share in what’s gone. The best of these dark days have been sleep worthy. I’ve been dreaming again, entering that valued space where a waking fantasy cannot recreate what the dreaming mind will manifest on its own.

I’ll write of a specific dream that causes me considerable worry, but not enough to become frightened off by the powerful images that are to be remembered as I make note of them here.

Shivering, I found myself near Heidegger’s hut on Todtnauberg (Death-Mountain), located in the Black Forest somewhere in obscure southern Germany. This tiny place is the famous retreat of Heidegger’s, where he’d eventually put together Being and Time. He found his peace here, away from them, the crowds he hated so much. In this setting I was expecting to find the old woodcutter busy at his typewriter, instead I found a dirty white-haired Nietzsche wrapped in a sleeping-bag as if he were homeless. I could safely say he was homeless here on Death Mountain, as summer was wearing off and a withering fire was put in motion to affect a little warmth for the now run down place. I instantly knew this was an older Nietzsche, a man who was here after death. Here we were together in my dream, Mr. Deleuze and Mr Nietzsche looking through each other for the first time.

While my mind’s eye pieced the scene together, he pulled out an insistent translucent arm and pointed near to where I stood, “See, this is the tarantula’s hole! Do you want to see the tarantula itself? Here hangs its web: touch it so that it trembles.”[1] I immediately knew to what he was referring to, and I was a little put off by the idea that he could be referencing himself as the tarantula. I had to quickly dismiss this because I detected that characteristic ironic sneer. The tarantulas in his Zarathustra were there to represent the poisonous people who sit around and wait self-righteously to attack those who are living freely, as he saw it. The life-affirmers live instead of contemptuously waiting to react and bite like the spider. He wasn’t here waiting for anyone, let alone me.

Although I shuddered at his macabre reference, I had to agree with him, to barely mutter under my breath, “Everywhere we see victory of NO over Yes, of reaction over action.”[2] His blurry crossed eyes glared towards me, he then stared out to the single window, and then Nietzsche became fixed on an odd photo of an overburdened camel on its fore-knees. The camel carries the heavy load of past morality, those tired values that are not yet gone and weigh the poor animal down, just like we are weighed down. No one had to tell me what this symbolized once I recognized it in the picture, tossed there on that greasy floor.

Surely, I had been toying with all these ideas of his lately, which could explain why he was performing as he was, without so much as an obligatory hello. It is unfortunate that philosophy should have ever become a condemnation of life. Thought over life is not worth living.

“Of all these heaviest things the carrying spirit takes upon itself, like a loaded camel that hurries into the desert…”[3] His outsized yellow-white mustache looked to be a burden as he said this. The legendary facial hair was a part of the mask he couldn’t do without. We want put these burdens upon ourselves as the ancients did when they privileged lofty thought over the fallible body. His mask was faded, yet couldn’t ever be an equivalent to these age old restrictions.

“We are always asked to submit ourselves, to burden ourselves, to recognize only the reactive forms of life…,”[4] I half said this aloud and to myself. I couldn’t tell if he knew I was still there. He was still listlessly looking out the window. I walked over to look out too. To my amazement, I could see a bright golden lion wandering around a clearing in the forest some hundred feet away, his fur was more radiant than blond. The animal’s presence over there assured me that I was in the company of my god-less hero, the master of allegory, a man of health and of suffering, this was a man of foreword looking visions.

His cracking voice then lightened and became youthful as he talked about the lion, “Once it loved ‘thou shalt’ as its most sacred, now it must find delusion and despotism even it what is most sacred to it in order to wrest freedom from its love by preying.”[5] This was the golden lion of my homeless visionary, the critic and destroyer of stagnancy that was tirelessly represented by the old ways. Nietzsche had to proclaim the death of god as a way to solidify his place in the transvaluation of Christian nihilism, as he was also the harshest critic of the requisite nihilism that resulted with god’s absence. Man could be empty without a god, getting rid of the divine solved only a fraction of man’s problems. We had to look for answers from within ourselves, and we had to crawl out of those arcane devotions to those ascetic religious and secular illusions with the new-found courage of a lion.

I had to leave the hut to get a closer look at the precious lion. I’d never see it again, this was my last chance to say goodbye to that myth of his. Walking out into the clear air only revived my fear that this beautiful scene would be ending soon. Everything is to return only as difference, a repetition of movement becoming a force of will. Becoming is a force of life immanent in our lives moving forward, changing us always. This will never be the same, and it’ll never be the self-same drama of our dreams again. I walked out and found no lion, and I easily cried, thinking that these tears would somehow replace that which once was. Acceptance of our pain only brings about a minor comfort. Life requires creative and experimental force to keep us from devaluing it any more than we should.

I held my head down to return to the hut, as night was encroaching. I opened the door and didn’t find my Nietzsche. I had to rub the tears from my face to believe what I saw there inside the warming room. There on the bed, where the old man once was convalescing, a calm baby sat upright reading a book. He noticed me right off, and with his delicate infant hand turned a page and waved to me to come nearer to read from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying.”[6]

I awoke with these last words and all I could say, as strange as it sounded on my lips, was ‘YES to life! YES to life!’ Only a child that once was the now dead Nietzsche in my dream could help me see this as I never have before. This was all I needed to move on, to think ahead and to live my life as never before.

Aurelio Madrid

[1] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, eds. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippen, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, p. 76.

[2] Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche / Pure Immanence – Essays on a Life, intro. John Rajchman, trans. Anne Boyman, New York: Zone Books, p. 75.

[3] Nietzsche, Friedrich, op. cit.: p. 16.

[4] Deleuze, Gilles, op. cit.: p. 71.

[5] Nietzsche, Friedrich, op. cit.: p. 17.

[6] Ibid.: p. 17.

notes on the origin of the work of art

March 24, 2011 § 3 Comments

Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ “Nature loves to conceal herself” ―Heraclitus

Let us never cease to take heed of MH’s ethical failures from which little is to be forgiven. To do this while considering the fine balance of his genius as related to his garish shortcomings is no small feat & it yields a pallid moral victory. The malevolent character of MH is an everyday vision of hubristic pressures, an ease of wisdom blinded by power & a primal ignorance found in a man, a man like any other person, who is capable of falling from a cherished enlightenment that we must always quest for in each other & ourselves. For this post we’ll gladly risk a moralizing gesture of occluding the eyes of this man who always wanted to uncover the truth (ἀλήθεια) of Being/Dasein. His explicit undermining of any humanistic ethos (ἔθος) with regard to his public/private/political affiliations, have forever besmirched his legacy, his character, & his brilliance, this should also explain why he will not be given his full name here, it will be abbreviated simply as MH. With all of this painful forwarding said, we’ll have to simultaneously conclude that to throw out his magnificent thoughts with the stupidity of his bigotry, cannot be fair. Please allow this philosophical journey on “The Origin of the Work of Art” with MH, to begin to feel the extent of his extreme capacities, to start to imagine a world set up by a man so utterly flawed & yet, so astoundingly gifted… 

This post was inspired into being by an ongoing philosophical discourse with Mr. Reinaert de V.

mh 3MH

MH (1889-1976)

“Origin of the Work of Art” (noted here as OWA), from: Martin Heidegger / Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, HarperCollins, 2008.

To question the origin of the work of art is to look for its essence, its ontology. The essence could, in a traditional sense be said to emanate from the artist. But for MH, the artwork is where the work manifests itself as art. The art cannot be said to be entirely found in the artist, or just the art as an object, instead from the art, from the created work of art after the artist’s hand has created it & put it forth as art to be appreciated on its own terms as revealing truth (ἀλήθεια). This means that we’ll be going to the artwork & not the artist to define the origin of a work of art. The origin of the work of art is where the essence of the art comes together. This is not just an encounter with a thing as we usually think of it. What the work of art is can be known through its work & the creative work therefore can be said to be its essence. This is where we’ll start to observe MH’s hermeneutical-circle, an investigative circle. MH confronts this questioning with “To enter upon this path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is the feast of thought, assuming thinking is a craft.” (OWA/144) So, it’s an unnamed & enhanced return to “to the things themselves” the dictum Husserl (MH’s mentor/teacher) was famous for. Thus, MH’s enhancement is decidedly beyond Husserl & becomes a phenomenological hermeneutic ontology of the art, of the art object, of the experience of the art, the uncovering of the ‘work-being’ of the art object. “…the result is that the works are naturally present as things.” (145/OWA) However we typically see art as more than a mere ‘thing’, it is more than what we constitute as a mere thing, it moves beyond being just a thing. This requires MH to define a thing, looking into this exceptional thing we call art & how it responds to what we call work. From this framework we’ll have to start with the thing. “…our aim is to discover the thing-being (thingness) of the thing.” (146/OWA) Anyway, the art object is often a thing. Then, let us inquire as to its thingness to differ from other things, such as equipment. “On the whole the word ‘thing’ here designates whatever is not simply nothing.” (147/OWA) For MH people are not simply things & other living beings are not just things. A distinction can be made between things that are made & those which are not. A utensil is not a thing in the same way as a useless rock is a thing. For MH three interpretations are how, by tradition we consider a thing: 1: a bearer of properties 2: unity of perceptions/actions 3: a composite of form & matter. A thing as MH writes, is not just an accumulation of characteristics, properties & traits, although we normally see things in this way. MH says that “We speak of this connection of the core of things.” (149/OWA) The question remains open as to whether or not this is the only way in which we observe & experience things. MH pushes us to question whether a thing is to be defined strictly as only a propositional structure: this is a thing & the traits that can be proposed of that object as a thing. Commonly we see a thing as something that can be ‘predicated’. We have already mentioned that this process of questioning, indeed very close to a bracketing, the epoché, or the phenomenological reduction, as Husserl would have it, of the thing to find & look for its thingly qualities this too is closely linked to Husserl’s epoché: Husserl’s letting go of the ‘natural attitude’ by which something/anything is given though the ‘intentionality’ of consciousness, thereby a search for the essence/s of the experience. All of Husserl’s so-called ‘idealism’ & along with his hard-won terms, have been arrogantly dropped by MH, but the overall phenomenological bones are still in place, whether MH wanted to admit to this or not. So perhaps, a thing is closer to matter (hyle/ὕλη), & form (morphe/μορφῇ), resulting in its outer appearance (eidos/εἶδος). Hyle: matter, physical characteristics that compromise color, density, sensual qualities of the thing. Morphe: form, how matter is brought together. Eidos: outward appearance, a synthesis of matter & form related to the man-made & to natural things as they appear. This way of observing a thing can be applied to a clump of earth &/or a tool. Once MH establishes that the question of observing, or seeking into the art object, a question of its thingness starts with qualities & therefore an issue of finding the art in the context of form & matter. As we openly regard the thing as not totally the complete being of the thing, we can see an obfuscation of a ‘natural’ way of observing the thing, this easily obscures the way the object is considered. A tradition can obscure the concealed truth of things. MH even proposes that rational thought is not the only way we apprehend a thing. For example, we’ll allow a mood or a feeling to have an efficacious access to the thing. The attempt is a clearing away to see the thing under inquiry as closed & seeing this closure as what needs to be opened up to be revealed. We must be aware that the thing cannot be said to be the mere sum of our sensual impressions of it. Form, matter & appearance are not the only ways to access the work of art. Form appears to impose itself into/onto matter, specifically in the case of a utensil, tool, man-made object. Heidegger explains that an average way of looking at form & matter has to do with usefulness & that matter follows the formal sense planned for the the thing. A selection of matter follows the form the thing will be useful for, hence a way to regard useful things.”A being that falls under usefulness is always the product of a process of making. It is made as a piece of equipment for something.” then followed by “Matter & form are in no case original determinations of the thingness of a mere thing.” (154/OWA) We can then differentiate between usefulness of pieces of equipment & the work of art. While at the same time recognizing that the tool is something more than a mere thing, as something by which it is useful to perform a job, said more directly: a thing to be useful, used. “As determinations of beings, accordingly matter & form, have the proper place in the essential nature of equipment.” (154/OWA) Our Being is different from the being of a thing, if MH’s project is said to be an ontology, then his project here is looking into the being of a work of art & concernfully placing it within what we can understand of our own Being (Dasein rarely gets mention in the essay, yet, it has a clear relationship to the way the art work is considered here & a way of ‘Being-in-the-world’). It is through a determination of the thing aside from its basic form & matter that MH wants to demonstrate, this perception shows how we commonly view things, namely as a question of usefulness. We’ll see with MH that this will be insufficient with regard to the work of art. At the same time we’ll choose to see it as a means & a necessary step, by which to begin to consider the work of art. A formal step from where to expand upon a meaning. Art is a “self-sufficient presencing” (154/OWA), unlike the gathered useful qualities of a tool. “…only one element is needful: to keep at a distance all the preconceptions & assaults [shades of getting rid of Husserl’s natural attitude] of the above modes of thought, to leave the thing to rest in its own self…” (157/OWA) “We ought to turn toward the being, think about it with regard to it’s being…[to] let it rest itself in its very essence” (157/OWA) The being of the thing is locked into how we understand our own Being. A being is made present to Being. MH then speaks of all the frustrations we’ve had in describing & getting close to a definition of the thingly qualities of the thing, to then remind us that this recalcitrance of the thing to be understood, should also be how we regard the thing as that which cannot be fully revealed. This is a key feature of its thingly qualities as dis/closed. “…then we shouldn’t force our way to its thingly character.” (157/OWA)

mh 1MH

MH resolves to consider the work of art now by way of stepping up to a precise view of equipment as he questions out from there. “The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness.” (159/OWA) “The equipmental being of equipment, reliability, keeps gathered within itself all things according to their manner & extent. The usefulness of equipment is nevertheless only the essential consequence of reliability.” (160/OWA) The equipment MH chooses to look at is a pair of shoes depicted in a Van Gogh’s painting. Ostensibly a pair of woman’s peasant shoes. A quick Google search locates the painting hanging in the Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam, this painting is with a short statement that the shoes were purchased from a Parisian flea-market & in fact, worn by Van Gogh in the rain before they were painted. We’ll give MH the benefit-of-the-doubt here & assume that he chose to overlook this tiny point (or, he just didn’t know about it). Anyhow, there are at least five to six paintings of Van Gogh’s that depict shoes, so there is no solid proof which painting MH refers to in this instance. From here MH mentions two central concepts with which he’ll devise to speak of art in general: ‘earth & world’. We’ll examine these in more detail later. “This equipment belongs to the earth, & it it protected in the world of the peasant woman.” (160/OWA) It is through the equipmental nature (being) of the equipment that the woman is said to walk & work the earth, in her world. The equipmental qualities can be looked as as potential, as potentiality. How we discern reliability depends on the usefulness of the thing & just as well, things can be said to fall out of reliability. MH illustrates that all this talk about the equipmental, as it relates to the shoes, demonstrates that if we step back, we’ll be forced to recognize that it was the painting that brought us to this equipment in the fist place.  Roughly, a tool, a piece of equipment is ‘present-to-hand’ when we consider it, & it is ‘ready to hand’ when it’s a means to an end. The shoes are usefully ‘ready-to-hand’ to protect the feet, typically they are not considered things of contemplation & when they are, their being is ‘present-to-hand’ for us “The artwork lets us know what shoes are in truth.” (161/OWA) The suggestion (again) that we wouldn’t be rendering all these nice thoughts of it, if it were not for the painting that’s ‘present-at-hand’ to take us there, thus a disclosing of truth as unconcealment: aletheia (ἀλήθεια, see: B&T Div. 1, §44 “Dasien, Disclosedness & Truth”). “In the work of art the truth of Beings has set itself to work.” (162/OWA) We can surmise that when MH seeks to find the essence of this artwork within the depiction of a pair of shoes, this is not only a depiction of things at random, but a depiction of the thing’s essence, this is a basic goal of phenomenology, a search for the essence of a thing, Being &c. The work of art is not a piece of equipment, it cannot be used as such, therefore it must be regarded as: a work of truth (ἀλήθεια).

mh 5MH

Next, we find Heidegger exploring & looking for the art in the artwork. While at the same time, not allowing the overall thingly qualities of the artwork to obstruct any view of the ‘work-being’ (the beingness of the work, let’s say) that’s concealed by the thing. MH has to push the artist aside & then look to the artwork as it presents itself as art, then to be found in the “work-being” (165/OWA) How can we access truth (ἀλήθεια) through this ‘work-being’ of art? Heidegger chooses to switch from Van Gogh to the ‘work-being’ of a non-representational work of art: an ancient greek temple, not as a leftover ruin, but as it was built to be used, in its time, as a temple of worship. This is where we move back to the concepts: earth & world. “The early Greeks called…emerging & arising in itself & in all things physis [φύσις][…] We call this ground earth.” (168/OWA) This term of his: earth, we’ll associate with the Heraclitus fragment 123: “Nature loves to conceal herself” (Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ ). It was with great effort to understand that in other texts MH states that physis (φύσις) is an equivalent to unconcealment (ἀλήθεια). If we look to the last few paragraphs of a paper MH wrote on Aristotle’s physis (PDF), we find a mention of the Heraclitus fragment where the interpretation is quite simple. If earth is said to be closed & physis (φύσις) is said to be open, then wouldn’t we who seek to open have to confront that which is naturally closed? To open something, to reveal something, vividly implies that something must be closed to begin with. Earth is physis (φύσις), as it is closed, & its being is to be unconcealed with Being. The temple then is said to open a world of what & how it is to set up a place of worship, for the community of people who use the temple. The temple is used as the truth (ἀλήθεια) of what the temple will be for them. The work that sets up the physical temple within the world, sets up a world by which the reality of worship can take place. Setting up means more than erecting a building. MH suggests this to mean a ‘consecrating, an invocation’. “Praise belongs to dedication as doing honor to the dignity & splendor of the god” (169/OWA) The truth of the work-being of the temple corresponds to how it is created/built on earth. Let us see MH’s world as essentially the structural parts of the way we are in the world as our world. A nice group of online seminars given at Harvard by Sean Dorrance Kelly, names the the structural parts of MH’s world to be defined as: rules/goals/equipment, primarily how the world is intelligible to Being. To this MH wants to say that we are ‘worlded’ by the world. We are living in a specific context. MH might’ve placed this as our ‘facticity’ our ‘throwness’, broadly meaning our particular/factical lived world as it’s placed/thrown in a specific time & place. As we’ve noted with respect to the way equipment is ‘ready-to-hand’ the utility of the temple obscures the way we experience the thing as present in the fullest sense of the word. Within a work of art this equipmental way of seeing the thing is questioned & can almost be reversed. Whenever we look at an artwork, walk into a building, hear a song, or write a poem, we should be letting go of experiencing these things as equipment to preform a task & look to find what the object reveals about itself. Not that we can’t do this with a tool, but the tool was not set up to be regarded in this way, yes, it’s designed to look good & desirable, but it just doesn’t operate as a work of art, even in the best examples. The work of art that sets up a world uses the raw material of the earth (φύσις). The earth (φύσις) is set up by the artist to be observed in the world, as seen through the lens of our world, maybe as MH says, the work is ‘worlded’ in the world. Remember to bear in mind that MH wants us to consider the earth as concealed. As much as we can draw up meaning & truth (ἀλήθεια) into our world from the earth, there are still aspects of the earth (φύσις) (that we are still using & otherwise) that will always remain closed. There is always something new to be found about the earth (φύσις) & her things. Art then would be a way of using the materiality & mysteries of the earth to understand & try to comprehend our world, grounding our place in the world. Our world seeks to reveal the secrets of the earth (φύσις) to find a way of living, to steward her precious resources & to seek preserve what cannot be lost, & to save what cannot be replaced. “As self-opening it [the world] cannot endure anything closed.” (174/OWA) Being automatically reveals that which is closed, whether what it finds is destructive is another story (see ‘enframing’ in MH’s “The Question Concerning Technology”). We hate that the earth (φύσις) doesn’t readily open up to us & we seek this opening (primordially) via our logos (λόγος). MH doesn’t mention this in the essay, let us make the logos (λόγος) leap ourselves.


“The opposition of the world & earth is strife.” (174/OWA) “Setting up a world & setting forth the earth, the world accomplishes this strife.” (175/OWA) The work-being in the work of art is located in the strife. This is being together with the products of the earth’s closure & the insistent openness of the world. Keep in mind that we need to see truth as open & closed at the same time, as art (on very general terms) is seeking to open the closed. The idea of strife must include the artistic struggle to bring about this fusion of earth & world as work-being. The art making process is an “instigation” (176/OWA), the strife of work-being. With MH we’ll now set about to question truth (ἀλήθεια) looking more in depth than earlier discussed (in this post). “Truth is the essence of the true.” (176/OWA) We need to learn & hold tightly onto the concept of aletheia (ἀλήθεια) to comprehend Heidegger in this essay & with its many references in “Being & Time, The Question Concerning Technology, On the Essence of Truth”, & in other MH texts. MH returns again & again to a way of thinking about truth (ἀλήθεια), with the masterful attempt to dislodge it from an everyday definition. This definition is normally where the locus of truth is in confirmation with the knowledge with a thing or a concept, a proposition, & a series of things we can say about the thing. This is basically moving deeper then a propositional statement about the thing. Of course, the everyday way of understanding truth cannot be done away with, but this way is not as primary as MH wants us to conceive of alethieia (ἀλήθεια). As we’ve noted aletheia (ἀλήθεια) is unconcealment, a revealing, a disclosure, it’s before logos (λόγος), before the apophansis (απόφανσις) of Husserl, & even before we can say anything about our apprehension of the phenomena. MH proposes that the phenomena of unconcealing is already there to be revealed by us (or not, depending). We have to be open to that which is revealed, attending to it, striving, perhaps in the mode of discovery as phenomenologically opened. MH quickly thrusts us in the clearing. “The clearing in which beings stand is in itself at the same time concealment.” (178/OWA) As much as anything can reveal itself in the clearing, there will be concealment. “Truth, is in its essence un-truth.” (179/OWA) Certain aspects of a being have to be concealed, mistaken, overlooked, misinterpreted, so that the truth (ἀλήθεια) that’s sought for & can be brought forth. MH’s clearing must be a recognition of aletheia (ἀλήθεια) as that which has not yet been opened. It is not as if Van Gogh’s shoes conform to one kind of perfect assertion that is then painted as the ultimate truth, but that for MH, Van Gogh’s shoes, a Greek temple, & a work of poetry, all are about dis/closure & never in the same way a piece of equipment is. One noteworthy effect of this unconcealing of truth (ἀλήθεια) has to do with beauty: “Beauty is one way in which truth occurs as unconcealment.” (181/OWA) MH wants to ask for the difference between work & creation. The question has arisen about the thinglyness of the the art & its insufficient way to completely experience the artwork. As we turn to the work, we’ll need to see this work as creation, to be sure, a combination of work & creation. A piece of equipment is worked into being, therefore a work of art is created into being. The bringing forth of the artwork is to be looked at through the term ‘techne’ (τέχνη). “The word techne denotes […] a mode of knowing.” (184/OWA) Techne (τέχνη) is not to be understood as out-right making, or manufacturing, rather a bringing forth. So in MH’s way of saying it, a work of art is bringing forth a world. Just the thought of techne (τέχνη) as creation is a valuable enough insight that’s easily lost today. “…to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work’s becoming of a work in a way in which truth becomes & happens.” (185/OWA) The techne (τέχνη) of the artist brings forth aletheia (ἀλήθεια) into the world by means of a physis (φύσις) as the upwelling into a thesis (θέσεις). When aletheia (ἀλήθεια) has been disclosed & set forth this by MH’s standards it is an ‘establishment’, as that which has not been seen before. “Truth establishes itself in the work.” (187/OWA) MH asks again what the createdness of the work contains, other than & including all of the above. Compared to strife the new term he brings out is ‘rift’. This rift is locked in with stife to be described as “…the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other.” (188/OWA) The rift is a kind of exposure of tension, an essential tension of earth & world. The tension too of physis (φύσις) & techne (τέχνη). So as the thing is what the artwork cannot do without, the work of the artwork is to be thought of as creation & as techne (τέχνη). Once truth (ἀλήθεια) is brought forth out into the open, declared & established a precedent has been set. “Creation is such a bringing forth.” (187/OWA) This bringing forth embodies & could incite a new truth (ἀλήθεια) that could be about controversy & to be taken to provocative ends by artistic means. The strife that exposes a rift is named a ‘figure’ by MH, the placement of the figure is a an enframing. This enframing term is extensively fleshed out in the essay “The Question Concerning Technology”. Enframing is the urge & destining of man to bring a technology out that additionally distances itself from basic necessity, a promethean effort ripe with potential & not without inherently dangerous pitfalls. As dangerous as this emframing urge can be, MH still sees its capacity as having the ability to save itself from itself. Emframing is a (post) modern dilemma, a perennial crisis & our eternal foe. For MH, art is never only a craft & the createdness that’s been made evident is obviously to be differentiated from  equipment. If we didn’t have enough terms to juggle around, MH has more fascinating concepts of note: ‘willing & preserving’. “willing is the sober unclosedness of that existential self transcendence which exposes itself to the openess of Beings as it is set into the work.” (192/OWA) This has to imply the essential openness & willingness of the art expert, the gallery owner, the concert goer &c., who keeps the artwork ‘alive’, who can be entirely open to the work & who can have the openness of her own Being, since MH presents this willing openness as in-fact an ecstatic openness to Being as described in Being & Time. Read this way, it should be implied that this openness could be the philosopher’s willingness to unconceal the artwork’s being, as kept going in the realm of Being. To the term preserving MH states that: “preserving the work as knowing, is a sober standing-within the awesomeness of the truth that is happening in the work.” (192/OWA) The willing & preserving are both critical to a seeking & a maintaining of truth (ἀλήθεια). This too can be how we have an age-old willingness & desire to keep a preservation of knowledge & to the pursuit of understanding itself. “Knowing as having seen is a Being resolved, it is standing within the strife that the work is fitted with its rift. (193/OWA) The work itself, in a world (possibly depending how its truth (ἀλήθεια) is revealed to an audience) determines whether it’ll be preserved. As we keep repeating, the upsurgence of earth (φύσις) in a work of art in a world, is much more than its thingly qualities, it’s more than just work & for these reasons, it can, in the very best instances, inspire a willing preservation. MH quotes Albrecht Dürer: “For in truth, art lies hidden within nature; he who can wrest it from her has it.” (195/OWA) This wresting is equated with the rift to bring, let’s say, to wrestle an essential opposition forth. A wrestling forth that exposes what has been concealed, a drawing out of closure. The enigma of earth’s hiding, as manifest in the art’s worlding. Not only does the truth that is “set-into” (196/OWA) the work, bring out its own need to be preserved as an artwork, it also is an enactment of this preservation itself, it too is a reserve of truth (ἀλήθεια). “…art is the creative preserving of truth in the work…” (196/OWA) Truth (ἀλήθεια) doesn’t just emerge out of nowhere & it is subject to its own thrown facticiy, its own specific placement in the world & its history. For MH poetry arises out of the fundament of earth (φύσις) from a language, a poeisis (ποίηση), a foundational expression: “If all art is in essence poetry then the arts of architecture, painting, sculpture & music must be traced back to poeisis.” (199/OWA) Poetry is a founding of truth. Poetry is “bestowing, grounding, & beginning.” (199/OWA) “Art lets truth originate.” (202/OWA)

Aurelio Madrid

ANAXIFORMINGES!” ―Ezra Pound, Canto IV

mh hutMH’s hut on ‘Death Mountain’. Photo: Patrick Lakey 2005. See Leland de la Duranaye’s fine article.

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