notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§129-141

October 20, 2013 § Leave a comment

hegel 7

Section 3 / The Good and the Conscience

§129

For Hegel, if anything, the good is the ultimate end, as it can be entwined with a conceptual will and a personal will. These are aspects of the realization of the “Idea.” This means that the good is a conceptualization of freedom. The good is actualized freedom.

§130

Conceptually speaking, welfare isn’t any good unless it has components of the good within it. When welfare achieves this, it is universal. And vise versa, right must also contain a conceptualization of welfare for it to have its universal reach. As Hegel puts it: “Fiat iustitia [let justice be done] should not have pereat mundus [even if the world shall perish]”, meaning that justice cannot be done at the expense of the world’s perishing.

§131

Will, for me (a thinking subject) must have the good as its goal, only if I’m able to make this a project for the will. I have to will to be good. Good doesn’t just happen without an effort on my part.

§132

Subjectively the will has a primary rational aspect that it must recognize. This is its formal aspect. It can be “true,” “opinionated,” or “false.” In a moral sense, a person recognizes these things, thus he is able to judge his actions good, bad, or annoying. This, of course, extends to the responsibility a person has over his actions with respect to the laws of the state. Later, it is odd to hear Hegel comparing an arsonist (lighting fire to one inch of wood) to an animal who should be hit on the head because it is prone to fits of rage, i.e. we need to realize the universal reach of our actions—instead of only our own selfish ends.

§133

Here, Hegel is referring to Kant’s deontological conception of morality, whereby the subject acts out of a duty that is linked to obligation, universality, and the “essential character of a subject’s will” (see footnote: Kant).

§134

But, what is this ‘duty’ anyway? Shouldn’t our real goal should be to promote the right and welfare.

§135

An unconditioned “determination of duty” is not sufficient (in Hegel’s critique of Kant’s deontological morality) since it doesn’t necessarily point to what to do next. Where can one go with unconditioned duty alone?

§136

Enter the conscience that is abstracted from the good, as it can also be made certain about the ends of the good. Not in particular, rather, in the most general sense of knowing about the good.

§137

That my conscience disposition contains within it a sense of the good and a sense of duty is a mere formality, i.e. a rational formality.

§138

The subjective is assumed under “right, duty and existence” to which we are somehow obliged to actualize.

§139

Putting all other determinations aside, the will is capable of acting universally or arbitrarily with evil. Ruminate on the origin of evil in the willfulness of man. Just as we are capable of doing good, we are simultaneously capable of doing evil. Evil resides in the speculative comportment of freedom. When the will succumbs to the selfishness of its desires it loses recognition of its universal comportment, it is then said to be evil. The notion—dare we say concept—of evil contains within it a “necessity of evil” that is always working to sublate its own negation. Evil is still arbitrary, as much as it is caught up in “particularity” rather than the ‘bigger picture’ in the form of the universal (see addition: presentation of the conceptual relationship between good and evil as dialectical by implication, biblically etc.).

§140

Self-consciousness knows how to position itself toward the good, for itself and for others. But, it is also capable of hypocrisy, i.e. self-consciousness can put on the veneer of right while doing otherwise. We are at a time when not only are we hypocritical, but we are also capable of being deluded into believing that evil is good.

(a) hypocrisy is:

α) cognition of the universal, right, duty etc.

β) the willing of the selfish ends.

γ) awareness of these two ‘moments’ as “bad conscience” (re: evil). Yet, there are problems with this, acting in awareness of our misdeeds, or acting in ignorance of our misdeeds, and questions as to where to place blame, etc.

(b) evil does not always present itself in a hypocritical mode. Evil also presents itself as being good. A man may also conflate any good he has done as a justification for his evil deeds.

(c) see footnote on “probalism” (re: Pascal). This “probalistic” view of morality suggests that if we can find a single good reason for our evil, then we are beguiled into thinking that the evil is somehow justified.

(d) Hegel seems to warn that we must be careful how we justify our intentions, as well as the motives behind those intentions, because good intentions may actually harbor evil intentions. Just because I aim to do good, doesn’t mean I’m justified in doing evil to bring about that good.

(e) simply because I “subjectively” deem my opinion to be justified, does not make it justified in any universal sense.

(f) irony sometimes posits itself as good while doing evil. If you decide to do evil ‘ironically’ while pretending that it’s in the name of the good, it doesn’t obviate the harm that’s done in the name of irony, bad jokes, mock evil, tragic-comic portrayals, and so on…, (see Hegel’s note () on Professor Solger’s account of irony as it relates to tragedy, Socrates etc. and also see addition, notes and footnotes, especially on Schlegel’s theory of irony, etc.).

Transition from Morality to Ethical Life

§141

The good and the conscience know the good, in a subjective sense—yet it is only when these are cast toward the universal, can they aspire to an ethical life. Morality, in and of itself, is insufficient as an end, it must, if it is to recognize itself leading an ethical life. The addition to this section helpfully notes: “[t]he sphere of right and that of morality cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation.”


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§105-128

September 28, 2013 § Leave a comment

philosophy of right v

Part Two / Morality

§105

As we have noticed, for Hegel the will is not only infinite, it is actual and it also a potential for a person as a subject.

§106

That the will of a person can be thought of conceptually and subjectively, and that this same person is a being, the subjectivity of the will is a conceptual entity for a human being. This idea is then able to become formulated and determined into existence as freedom that manifests into a morality that grasps the universality of will.

§107

Not only can the person recognize that his will exists as a determination, he also conceptualizes what to do with it. He, via a conception of a universal will, can subjectively determine to himself a concept of morality that extends to the objective world around him.

§108

Hegel has already covered the abstract qualities of the will, from its “being in itself” as it is in relation toward its “being for itself”, i.e. the actualizations of the potentialities of the will—these are its “formal” aspects in its “infinite self-determination.” This is not exactly the same as conceptuality of the will, whereas someone would still have to recognize a relationship that extends to other people. Dialectically, the will is opposed to this in its conscious finitude and must sublate this negative into a morality toward others (see addition: notice the differentiation between the moral and the ethical. Also be sure to note the differences between Kant’s morality, with respect to his deontological categorical imperative, and Hegel’s limitations on morality in these sections).

§109

Primarily, we recognize that the will has with it an opposition between its subjectivity and its objectivity and these must be sublated conceptually (re: self-determining will).

“In the self-determining will, determinacy is”:

α) selfish, only for itself.

β) wanting to overcome the selfishness.

γ) perhaps this critical opposition will help the selfish will out of his selfishness.

§110

(A) A kind of freedom solidifies determinations. The will could take this as a chance to act morally.

§111

(B) The content of the will, its manifest contingencies, make for the specific determinations of a person. This is universal. These are aspects of the will:

α) the person knows he is willing.

β) the person knows he has to act, since he is willing, yet, his conceptual subjective scheme is not always in conformity with the rest of the world (you can say that again).

§112

(C) I identify with the will of others, and at the same time, I recognize my will working in tandem with theirs—hence, we (hopefully) act with a positive recognition toward others.

“Objectivity contains three moments”, or rather, it’s dialectically triadic:

α) objectivity.

(…sublation…)

β) concept..

§113

A man is moral in action.

An action is:

α) my externality.

β) working conceptually with the outer world.

γ) working in tandem with others.

§114

Three aspects of the right are made manifest in the will:

(A) I put forth a will for what is right.

(B) The action manifests in its specific contingency:

α) in its intention.

β) in its conceptualization.

(c) The conceptualization of the action is such that, for Hegel, it is made to be universal and objective, whether it is evil or conscientious.

Section 1 / Purpose and Responsibility

§115

A person’s will is made manifest in its contingency, in its finitude, and is defined by his action in the objective world as a “deed” that he is subsequently responsible for.

§116

I am not entirely responsible if something of mine (unattached for my person) accidentally hurts you, but ultimately—in the bigger picture—I am.

§117

The will finds that it wants to act, yet it is still merely finite, while at the same time, it must be able to take responsibility for its actions, and its deeds.

§118

Insofar as we must take responsibility for our actions, we must also recognize that our action have a wide range of consequences. Sometimes these consequences extend beyond the original purpose enough to lose the original intent and from which our responsibility fades.

Section 2 / Intention and Welfare

§119

An action can manifest into an infinite number of configurations. Dialectically, the individual is a sublation of the universal, and these actions have a wide ranging scope. This is where the individual’s intention becomes universalized (see diagram below: the A, B, and C points are the original contingent actions and then notice unique emanations stem from each action). These actions can have the insidious effect of malcontent, e.g. arson or murder etc.

clip_image001

§120

A person’s intentions, seen as universal, are objective and can be said to be rightful products of a thinking person’s will.

§121

For Hegel, a person has willed an action into being and this is universal. The person can take pleasure in the products of his actions—but, is he acting morally in his self-satisfaction?

§122

Yes, your self-satisfaction with a deed can be a means to an end, and for this reason we find nothing beyond your selfish intention.

§123

To what end do your actions serve?

α) to see them through, to promote your contingent will.

β) they can also serve to define finitude of self-gratification (re: vice, opinion, anger, hunger etc.).

§124

Simply because you are self-satisfied in the appeasement of your desires, does not make you any more worthwhile.

§125

The subjective will looks after its welfare and it knows that it has to respect the welfare of others, but if this all there is, with no actualized implementation, then it is mere hypocrisy.

§126

Your corrupt self-righteousness can be invalidated, no matter how much you think it must be otherwise.

§127

There may be occasions whereby we would have to commit a wrong to save a life, re: if it is for done for a right of necessity. Therefore, for such a ‘crime,’ we cannot be made to pay more than we have, as with beneficium competentiae (see footnote: “beneficence of need”).

§128

For Hegel, all of the above serves to designate the finitude of the will in a narrow moralistic sense, i.e. the self-righteous flattery of moral rectitude doesn’t extend beyond it’s selfish desires and modes of well-being—it’s good, it’s alright, but it’s limited.


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§82-104.

September 26, 2013 § Leave a comment

notes on the philosophy of right iv

Section 3 / Wrong

§82

In a contract, what is right is already assumed. For Hegel, this becomes wrong when the two rights are brought together and one is “particular” (or peculiar) in a way that differs from the other. The opposing right, in its particularity, is a “semblance” (counterfeit) of right, it is only resolved when it negates itself to become right and not universal.

§83

Even if wrong is merely a semblance of right, it desires to be self-sufficient. The wrong may appear to be right, or it is a clear nullity of the right, i.e. it’s just wrong, in the sense of the latter, it is a crime.

A. Unintentional Wrong

§84

Possessions and contracts are drawn up by particular individuals, with any particularities that become inevitable under such agreements. These can be made legal in the universal recognition of the agreement. But, these can be interpreted in differing ways. Hence, we have the growth of varied disagreements resulting from the festering misunderstandings.

§85

With civil law we make claims (or disputes) onto things that have to do with individuals and/or their property, we find that disputes of this kind are brought about by basic questions having to do with what is properly mine, or yours, along with any subsequent negations.

§86

When we have only our particular interests in mind, right is made into a mere “semblance” (counterfeit) of itself, perhaps represented as an obligation. Yet, when confronted with universal right, as it is in-itself, two people can (hopefully) be made to recognize something beyond their mutual disagreement/s.

B. Deception

§87

Deception is brought about by an individual’s “reduction” of the right to a semblance, which must be a counterfeit of right. Deception occurs, if we are fooled into thinking that the deception is right.

§88

Although a contract, concerning property etc., can be legitimate, another’s respect for the universal will may not be in line with the actual terms of the agreements in the contract.

§89

The universal aspect of right must be held, above and beyond, that which is arbitrary. Anything that does not recognize this is deceptive.

C. Coercion and Crime

§90

To own something means you can bribe someone with it (as an unfortunate manifestation of your monomaniacal suffering).

§91

Although certain people can be dominated by others due to their obsequiousness, my free will can resist being physically beaten. My free will might fall weak to banal external enforcements—only if I let in.

§92

Force and coercion work in tandem to destroy the willing, the willful.

§93

Coercion can be sublated (Aufheben) by coercion. Also, we must unfortunately, allow for forms of coercion that are obliquely horrible (re: pedagogical).

§94

We will be sure to recognize that abstract right has it within its power to coerce the wrongfulness placed on it.

§95

To infringe on another person’s rights, by coercion, is a crime. Hegel mentions the curious “negatively infinite judgment” [I’m continuing to research Hegel’s use of the judgment in his Logic] provisionally, the infinite judgment seems to be a judgment that is made between the individual and the “notion” (concept) and an infinite judgment must be when we are trying to subsume the ‘big picture’ in our way of judging the conceptual nature of things. So, a negative infinite judgment must go against a positive judgment, therefore, it is a crime. Crime, not only negates my will, it also tries to obviate my universal “capacity for rights.”

§96

Surely, there must be a variance of quality and quantity by which we can assess a crime’s malfeasance. This must be determined in relation to the specific damage visited upon another person. Crimes manifest in a multitude of guises and must be considered with due measure.

§97

When a crime is committed, there is an attempt to nullify a person’s rights. So, in turn, there is the open possibility to then nullify the negation (re: to right the wrong). Punishment seeks to sublate the wrongdoing.

§98

Your evil “infringement” is only external, therefore, you should be held responsible for any or all property damage incurred by your spurious malfeasance.

§99

Another person, can willfully injure my person, in so doing, this person is positively wrong, i.e. an injurious crime cannot coincide positively with the existence of other’s rights, freedoms, wills, etc. The only positive place for the injurious crime remains with what criminal does against me (see footnote: Feuerbach’s father).

§100

A criminal sets up a kind of law unto his crime—punishable offences are often rationalized into existence.

§101

Crimes are to be punished according to the quality and quantity of the crime committed. Your injustice deserves a proper punishment (review lengthy section again, re: the absurdity of an eye-for-an-eye, etc.).

§102

Revenge doesn’t always exact an equivalent justice and it can be sustained throughout generations. Revenge might lose its original complaint over the years.

§103

To resolve a wrongdoing, the “subjective will” must aspire/appeal to the “universal will” to lay claim to justice, rather than to simply declare revenge.

Transition from Right to Morality

§104

We must acquire within ourselves the universal ability to recognize when we have been wronged, hereby making an advancement in the determination/s of our will. This must be a self-actualization that is transferable within our relationship with others. Freedom develops from the will in the abstract to be made self-determinate. Our will is made actual in our possessions. When we hold these possessions in common with others, we do so under contract. For something to be wrong the contingency of an individual’s will poses as a semblance of right (and so, banality continues in its counterfeit mode, ad infinitum…). It is at this point where we can (with Hegel’s assistance) progress to questions of morality.


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§44-81

September 26, 2013 § Leave a comment

notes on the philosophy of right iii

Section 1/ Property (continued)

§44

For Hegel, a person has the right to own things and to take them up as his own (appropriation). Hegel references the Kantian “thing-in-itself.” Things are made evident by a determination of free will to take possession of them. Thus, the absolute will binds with the finitude of things to become an extension of the infinite (see footnote: Kant’s thing-in-itself).

§45

We take power in the ownership of property and thereby property becomes an extension of our freedom, not as a means, but simply as part of it.

§46

Private property is an extension of will and this is not arbitrary, nor is to be subsumed into state (communal) property which would be a denial of personal freedom, since the objects we own are the physical aspects of our will and cannot be taken away arbitrarily.

§47

I own my body because I will it. For Hegel, animals don’t share this willing ownership of their corporeality.

§48

The body and spirit are incommensurate until the spirit becomes self-consciousness, that is, until my spirit is made actual by my body—the body becomes the vehicle of spirit. The spirit cannot be made to be entirely separate from the body. Because of this, physical injury to my body is injury to my spirit, will, freedom etc.

§49

I can own things, and that I own particular things, does not mean that everyone needs to own the same things, or the same amount of things. The things I own are brought about by the effort I have made to acquire them (see footnote: Fichte’s “civil property”).

§50

A person owns things as a feature of his own free will. If another person wishes to take possession of such things, they have to confront my free will, not simply because I owned it first.

§51

The fact that I can own something as an extension of my own free will, doesn’t mean much until this ownership potential stands in relation to other people. Rightful ownership implies a communal relationship to things.

§52

When we take possession of a thing, we also take possession of its very materiality (see footnote: Fichte).

§53

The will is related to its possession in three ways:

(α) Positive: I possess the thing.

(β) Negative: I do not possess the thing.

(γ) Infinite judgment: I possess the thing that I do not want, alternately, I want to possess the thing I cannot have (re: alienation).

A. Taking Possession

§54

To possess something comes before ownership of something. Ownership is a designation of my determination to formalize the possession of the thing.

§55

(α) When we take possession of something (physical seizure) I’ll have to understand that I can do this, not only with my hands, but by other means. Some things (land, rivers etc.) are extended beyond my mere grasping of them, therefore, I can be said to possess these things too.

§56

(β) When I make something from what I possess, this form becomes (exists as) something other than me. It has a ‘life’ of its own.

§57

My body is my own, but it does not become my own till I become self-conscious enough to make it an actuality. It is not enough to be human. One has to become a person (re: a slave has to actualize his personhood first, before he can take the necessary steps to become emancipated).

§58

(γ) A sign (signifier) can be placed on my possession to designate it as mine, yet this is not ownership outright, it is merely a sign of that possession.

B. Use of the Thing

§59

Under my capacity to own a thing is a primary relationship with that thing, in that, I can use this thing. With that possibility, it should not follow that if I do not use (or need) the thing, it will no longer be mine. This also means that if I choose to destroy and/or modify the thing, I can do so as I see fit.

§60

If I can take possession of a thing that multiplies (re: livestock etc.) I also take possession of the thing’s capacity to grow. Thereby, I also own its products.

§61

I also own the manifestations and growth of my possessions, to whatever end they become or decline.

§62

If I do not completely own something, I must take into consideration that it belongs to someone else when I make use of it.

§63

The thing’s usefulness determines its use-value. When I own something, I can, not only, use it, but I can also place a value on it.

§64

Insofar as I own and possess things of value, the signs and usefulness have to be “prescribed”, in other words, I have to “prescribe” this thing as my property. So if I lose track of my possession, I also lose track of my capacity to own it (?).

C. The Alienation of Property

§65

I can, if it is in my will (or lack thereof) let things go and I can relinquish my ability to hold onto things.

§66

We have “inalienable” rights to our own personality, religion, ethics, happiness, sorrow, suffering, etc. Which means that spirit is something “cuis natura non potest concipi nisi existens” (whose nature cannot be conceived other than as existing) Spinoza, Ethics 1,1 as quoted by Hegel.

§67

I can offer my services for hire or for payment, then, presumably, for Hegel, I can become a slave to someone else.

§68

In this section it is unclear if Hegel is addressing copyright issues, or, if he is simply suggesting that one can make use of someone else’s intellectual products.

§69

Here Hegel does address intellectual property rights and how an author has universal rights of ownership over his intellectual products.

§70

Here, Hegel forbids suicide. I cannot dispose of my own life. I must die of some other means, or by another’s hand (see footnote: Kant, Fichte, Roman suicide, etc.).

Transition from Property to Contract

§71

No one can own me, unless I give them the right to own me. The power I afford you is the equivalent to a lack self-consciousness I have over myself. I have self-consciousness over myself. Therefore, you cannot have power over me.

Section 2 / Contract

§72

I can, as is the manner of my will, make real the ability to contract my property to another person. When I do this, I negate my will’s responsibility for the property (after the contract is signed, of course!).

§73

If I choose to externalize my will in an agreement with another person (re: in a contractual agreement), our wills are unified under this agreement, until my possession/property/object is made rightfully theirs.

§74

Our mutual wills, in a contractual agreement, are bound and unified together under an agreement if I’m willing to rid myself of a possession/property/object.

§75

(α) Arbitrary will: two persons, in a mutually willing agreement, deciding to join in a contract.

(β) Common will: two person’s wills are joined in a contract.

(γ) Individual external thing: the product/s that are exchanged by means of a contract.

(see footnote: Kant’s “[…] reciprocal enjoyment of one another’s sexual attributes.”).

§76

The contract has to be an agreement between two persons of mutual consent, whereby one is accepting a possession (or possessions) and the other is willing to be “alienated” from that possession.

§77

When two persons join in a contractual agreement, they are obliged to have the same or equivalent things of value to be exchanged as an agreement of the contract. This suggests that one cannot offer something that becomes devalued before the object is exchanged. The contract is an exchange of things of equal value, or at least, of agreed upon value.

§78

The contract has to be something of a representation of the terms of agreement between the consenting persons joined in the contract. In other words, draw up a contract—get it in writing.

§79

A “stipulation” of the contract has to be stated its terms according to each person’s will in full detail, so as to avoid confusions, lawsuits etc. (see footnote: Fichte).

§80

The contract has to be designed and structured according to the agreement/exchange in question:

A. Contract of gift.

B. Contract of exchange.

C. Wages contract

D. (name your contract, etc…).

§81

The conditions of the contract have to be such that the mutual wills are in fact mutual and both are in agreement to meet the terms of the contract, to the fullest extent of each particular will. In this respect the wills of consenting persons, as mentioned earlier, are unified under the agreement/s. If these terms are not met, we move into what Hegel considers to be wrong.


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§34-43

September 26, 2013 § Leave a comment

notes on the philosophy of right ii

Part 1 / Abstract Right

§34

For Hegel the abstract conceptualization of the will is immediate in its determinacy as it develops. Whereas, in a moral sense, the will has to act in opposition to its abstract potential, it is universal toward its own determinacy as that of a person (in society, as an individual). Think of a progression from universality → particularity → individuality.

§35

The potentiality of the will is its universal character in the person. When I (a person) recognize this determinacy in its content (re: how the drives are manifested), this is how my finitude is revealed. In my finitude (within my limitations) I am connected to the universal, this is a universal aspect of who I am. A person has the ability to make what he becomes. This is his universal finitude, and this aspires to the infinite.

§36

Our contingent personality has the right as its innate potential. Since we can recognize that the will’s formal contents expose our finitude as our limitations, we can recognize and respect this in others (idea possibly via Fichte).

§37

The elements of the will are present it its content (its manifestations), yet this is not the whole of our personality. Our rights and freedom are only parts of the whole of who we are.

§38

For Hegel, the concept of right in its abstract sense is only a possibility of what cannot be done. Presumably, this means that what can be done is limited by what cannot be done.

§39

A person’s relation to the world is in opposition to his subjective willing. Personality sublates exteriority to become an individual existence.

§40

The immediacy of right is freedom:

A. …abstract will owns this right (we have the right to possess things).

B. …a person has the ability to recognize this in others, as he recognizes himself (contractual arrangements).

C. …a person also sees himself as different (hence, this is where we disagree with others, we see them as wrong and then we chose to commit violent, petty and/or white-collar crimes upon them).

Section 1 / Property

§41

To externalize his freedom, a person has to extend himself in opposition to the infinite will (as a wish to become it). Because of this, he must simultaneously recognize that the world does not automatically correspond to this (reality check!).

§42

There is a vivid difference between the personal freedom of our spirit and the external world that thwarts this (re: we are all up against the thing-ness of the world in its immediacy and in its harsh externality).

§43

The conceptual immediacy of the person naturally (and eventually) has to commune with the external world. His products, science, art, religion, etc. are examples of this mediation with the externality of things. As he is able to control these things, these objects become salient expressions of Spirit.


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / preface & §§ 31-31, 1-3

September 26, 2013 § Leave a comment

notes on the philosopy of right

§31

For Hegel the methodology of philosophical science is in its conceptualization. It is immanently progressive, which means that it is dynamic. This dynamic progression of philosophy happens by means of (Hegel’s) logic (which is not the logic we normally think of. Instead, Hegel’s logic is metaphysical and ontological). Philosophical progress is not entirely circumstantial, nor is it entirely universal (?). The concept of it dialectically dissolves and provides the particular. Hegel’s dialectic is not about getting to the ‘opposite’ sides of things, rather, it is a “higher dialectic”, it apprehends its content developmentally and it is immanently progressive as it arrives at its ‘positive’(affirmative) end. It is the soul of things. Its object is rational and this is its freedom.

§32

The shapes of dialectical and dynamic determinations are conceptual and they are part of the larger “Idea” of things. This is speculative philosophy (i.e. it is seeking to holistically reconcile differences). Hence, the way things are and what they are becoming are brought together into a comprehensive “Idea” (re: the Absolute) in its ever-changing totality.

§33

A. The will is immediate, abstract and external.

B. The will has a universal subjective component that moves in opposition to its external and universal parts. Good internal (?) Existent world external (?) reconciled into the “Idea”.

And the ethical is…

(a) Natural spirit, where one is most familiar (?)—the family.

(b) Division and appearance, where one is unfamiliar and has to make his own (?)—civil society.

(c) As freedom is in its complete actuality (?)—the state.

Preface

Hegel’s philosophy is a “speculative mode of cognition” (i.e. a dialectical reconciliation that always aims for the Absolute—as in ‘the big picture’) and its aim is to save itself from its own decline. The aim is not to dictate truth or to moralize. Philosophy seeks to know matters as they are. Philosophy must see its actual nature as rational. Freedom of thought is not about simply opposing the rules of the state. The ethical world is a self-actualized realization (re: a trans-formal conceptualization). Some people think philosophy is easy, and such people, as Jacob Friedrich Fries, thought that philosophy was all about the heart, friendship and enthusiasm—instead, it is more like (Hegel’s) rationalism. This is not a feel-good or superficial philosophy via Fries (and others). It is not clear if Hegel agrees with Plato’s conception of ethics, but Plato might agree with Hegel’s slogan that “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.” Therefore, philosophy’s goal is an explanation of the rational. Philosophy need not get caught up in every detail, since it knows that the infinite is immanent in the transient. Philosophy should not get caught up in prescriptions and instructions. Philosophy is not just about empty words, but how things actually are. (re: “Hic Rhodus, hic saltus” [don’t just talk about it] jump here, as [you jumped] in Rhodes). Philosophy is about the reconciliation toward the rational in actuality. Philosophy is the road toward God. “The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.” This famous quote means that Hegel’s philosophy can only see things clearly when the dust of history has settled. Philosophy is practiced after the facts have made themselves evident.

Introduction

§1

Philosophy concerns itself with the concept of right (freedom) and this right is the “Idea” and is a concept in actuality.

§2

The right is an aspect of philosophy having to do with the “Idea” as reason, as its development, and as it is immanently developed. It is not a mere definition, but it is a concept developed from its content (re: Concept → Idea → Absolute).

§3

Right is realized in…

1. Form: rational order.

2. Content: parts.

a. In the character of people and in its natural necessity.

b. In its external application.

c. In its decisiveness.


Aurelio Madrid

notes on hegel’s philosophy of right / §§ 10-30

August 29, 2013 § Leave a comment

student lecture notes hegel phil of right

§10

For Hegel, the will is immediate and in-itself or it is a concept that is for-itself, meaning that the will is a potential and it can also be actualized, this actualization does look different than the simple will in-itself. The will in-itself is finite. A shallow view of the will (re: understanding) only can grasp the will as being in-itself, a mere potentiality. Understanding sees the will as limited (abstract) and not connected it to the ideas of truth and freedom.

§11

The will in-itself is free and the self-determining parts as the drives, desires and inclinations, constitute its content (the particulars). In this way, the will does not have its complete rational form and is finite. The finitude of our individual desires is not equivalent to the infinite of the rational that extends itself beyond the instance of each person.

§12

The content (drive) is immediate in the will as universal and it is individualized in each person (re: resolutions and decisions). How the contents of the will are determined against indeterminacy individualizes us.

§13

The finitude of consciousness is the difference between us as human, i.e. our decisions are part of who we are as specific individuals. Only when the will becomes rational does it rise to the universal blend of content and form, whereas the form (the rational) provides the structure to the content (drive).

§14

The infinite will is self-reflective, although it has control over its content it is still tied to them. The ‘I’ is made for this determination from content (drive) to form (reason).

§15

This section seems to be Hegel’s attack on common conceptions of freedom as merely arbitrary (?). This arbitrary view is abstract (partial) and is determinate on externality. “Being able to do as one pleases” is too elementary. Common reflection only allows the will to be manifested by the outside world. The will is rational and therefore not entirely arbitrary.

§16

The will is bound in the actual choices it makes.

§17

Hegel wants to include the arbitrary as a contradiction (opposed to) conflicting drives, whereas one wins out over the other.

§18

For Hegel, man is inherently evil and so he needs to “liberate” himself toward God and away from his originally base nature.

§19

For man’s drives to be purified, they must be freed from their base nature. The drives can become rational in content to be made into a science, morality, ownership, sociability and love.

§20

When reflection (intelligence) is applied to the content (drives), via happiness, it can bring about a formal (rational) universality—hence education.

§21

Once we are able to make the content (drive) of the will rational (re: infinite form), the will is free not only in-itself (potential), but also for-itself (actualized), thus becoming something closer to an ideation or conceptualization of truth. Freedom is willed by its own content.

§22

The object of will in-itself is freedom and this becomes universal and infinite as it is actualized, presumably within the constraints of our own specific actuality, in our specific place in the world.

§23

Will, under Hegel’s rationalism, is completely free in reference to itself. Perhaps because we can only be free when we have acknowledged that we can think and conceptualize for ourselves?

§24

Hegel’s ‘speculative’ rationalism calls for the very limitations of will to be included within the structure of will’s becoming. To become universal, real-world limitations have to be superseded by the will. This kind of universality is not abstract (partial) it has to be realized within the individual—therefore it is concrete (real).

§25

The subjective will is threefold: it is pure form, and pure certainty (purely rational?); it contains the arbitrary contingent content of our drives; and it is one-sided.

§26

The objective will is threefold: it can conceptualize itself as objective will; it lacks the infinite because it’s looking outside for its determinations; its existence is external only. But, for Hegel, the objective and subjective are not separable.

§27

For Hegel, it is rational to suggest that freedom should see itself as an object.

§28

The will overcomes the contradiction between the objective and subjective and this is essential to its idea, or ultimate conceptualization, of it.

§29

The right, by definition, is a manifestation of the will as free in the purely rational ways described above.§30The “right is utterly sacred” according to Hegel, as it becomes fully developed and actualized freedom.


Aurelio Madrid

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